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The United States remains unprepared to cope with the possibility of an attack on a major city 
by terrorists capable of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device. Long-held anxi-
eties about the non-survivability of nuclear war promulgated during the intense U.S.—Soviet 
arms race from the late 1940s through the 1980s, and reluctance to consider low probability/high 
consequence events among local disaster planning priorities, are barriers to developing plans that 
could dramatically save lives in the event of a terrorist-based nuclear detonation.
 In a speech in Prague on April 5, 2009, and reiterated in his 2010 State of the Union message, 
President Obama articulated themes about nuclear terrorism that have circulated in U.S. political 
debate since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and with greater urgency since 9/11:
“…We must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most 
immediate and extreme threat to global security. One terrorist with one nuclear 
weapon could unleash massive destruction. Al Qaida has said it seeks a bomb and 
that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured 
nuclear material across the globe. To protect our people, we must act with a sense of 
purpose without delay.”1
This paper begins by describing the reality of the threat of nuclear terrorism to the United States 
and the enormous scale of lives lost and physical destruction that would result from the detona-
tion of even a small improvised nuclear device (IND) in an American city. It then systematically 
lays out the gross inadequacy of current response capabilities, and highlights the critical unmet 
need for urgent, deliberate and well-funded planning efforts to address those deficiencies. In 
the Recommendations section, Columbia University’s National Center for Disaster Preparedness 
(NCDP) calls for targeted public health and medical care regional planning and response efforts 
focused on “gray zones”—areas where significant life saving opportunities would exist follow-
ing an IND detonation, and where preparedness planning and proper training can meaningfully 
enhance survival and recovery.
The collapse of the Soviet Union dramatically reduced the Cold War “doomsday” threat of nuclear 
war against the United States. Yet, the danger of a nuclear attack has not been eliminated; rather 
it has evolved into a new and dramatically different threat—nuclear terrorism. The risk of a nuclear 
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weapon being used today by terrorists is, in fact, a growing threat and “our margin of safety is 
shrinking.”2 Future nuclear threats “will be defined first by the desire and then by the ability of 
non-states to procure or develop crude nuclear weapons.”3
Although the detonation of a low-yield IND in an American city is one of the 15 planning scenar-
ios developed by the White House Homeland Security Council for use in security preparedness 
activities, local and regional emergency planning activities have not given attention commensu-
rate to this threat. Barriers to planning for such a catastrophic event are not well understood but 
may be related to fatalistic beliefs or concepts of improbability, with many believing that other 
disasters are more probable and merit the focus of emergency planners. “The Cold War threats 
of nuclear war between states suggested total destruction, making preparedness measures futile, 
but the same is not true for nuclear terrorism. Furthermore, emergency planners are frozen by the 
‘myth of planning futility,’ in which planners hold on to the belief that nuclear detonations are not 
survivable. However, despite the enormous scale of potential lives lost and destruction of infra-
structure, data from Drs. William Bell and Cham Dallas and from Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory suggest a ‘gray zone’ in which hundreds of thousands of lives would be saved, and the 
injury severity could be mitigated with appropriately targeted planning.”a
Following a nuclear detonation, a response based on threat-specific strategies will be essential to 
maximize time-sensitive life-saving opportunities. Public protective actions to reduce exposure and 
injury, critical within the first hours, will depend greatly upon a well thought out, pre-event mes-
saging strategy and the ability to communicate easily-understood information to the public. The 
risk for injury and nuclear detonation effects does not end after the initial blast; the public must 
understand the correct protective actions and when to take them throughout the response and 
recovery phases.
Long before significant levels of federal and extra-regional assets would arrive, local and state 
officials would need to launch numerous operations–many at the same time. Meeting the enor-
mous scale of health care demands, including the vital tasks of triage and decontamination as well 
as sheltering and evacuation needs, is a logistical challenge that will require the coordination of 
efforts at local, state, and, most importantly, regional levels.
The NCDP believes that large-scale and integrated regional and national response planning is 
needed to prepare for a detonation of an IND. The absence of such planning is an urgent and unmet 
need. To initiate this process, emergency planners should first understand the reality of the threat 
and appreciate the unprecedented scale of response that regional governments will have to mount. 
a  Dr. Irwin Redlener, National Center for Disaster Preparedness, Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health.
3Executive Summary
The detonation of even a small IND in almost any major American city would cause massive mor-
tality and morbidity as well as a collapse of infrastructure that would create long lasting and far 
reaching impacts. Regional planning bodies must accelerate substantive planning that is framed by 
the assumption that survivability and recovery can be maximized, and that the public’s understand-
ing of their role in the response is vital to this end. Responsible units of government at all levels 
need to establish regional planning agendas with scalable, realistic objectives, and rigorous periodic 
exercises now, before disaster strikes. The NCDP urges the development of regional response plans 
based on optimizing survivability in the gray zone and recommends a number of concrete steps to 
achieve that outcome:
1. Require all jurisdictions that are federally designated as high risk IND target communi-
ties to develop and sustain appropriate preparedness for possible nuclear terrorism;
2. Strengthen regional alliances and coalitions developed to implement effective 
response strategies;
3. Require all federally funded regional alliances to demonstrate robust plans for region-wide 
health, public health and sheltering response to IND detonation;
4. Provide sufficient funding for all aspects of preparedness for IND terrorism;
5. Greatly expand capacity of national rescue and recovery efforts, including relevant federal 
agencies, to respond in the event of an IND attack anywhere in the U.S, including spe-
cialized training with respect to functioning in high-level radiation events;
6. Clarify incident command roles and operational integration procedures among federal, 
state and local authorities in the event of an IND attack;
7. Ensure that Strategic National Stockpiles of countermeasures—as well as corresponding 
stockpiles on a state level—are relevant for an IND detonation and are scaled up to meet 
the likely demand;
8. Accelerate—and exercise—multi-sector response planning that includes government 
entities, non-governmental organizations and private sector assets;
9. Research and implement strategies designed to communicate risks and appropriate public 
responses to an IND detonation;
10. Pursue relevant research to improve effectiveness of countermeasures;
11. Ensure that highly redundant and multi-format modalities of communicating with the 
public during and after IND terrorism are developed, tested and available; and,
12. Consider re-opening and/or developing stocked public shelters for populations in high 
risk communities.
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Nuclear Terrorism: The Reality of the Threat
In an analysis of the U.S. Department of Energy’s nonproliferation programs with Russia, a 2001 
bipartisan task force concluded that nuclear terrorism is “the most urgent unmet national security 
threat to the United States.”4 During the 2004 presidential campaign, Senator John Kerry and Pres-
ident Bush agreed that nuclear terrorism is a leading threat to the security of the homeland and, 
in a 2008 report to the United Nations General Assembly, then International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) Director General, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, again alerted the world that the 
“possibility of terrorists obtaining nuclear or other radioactive material remains a grave threat.”5 
He also commented on the lack of security of these materials; “Equally troubling is the fact that 
much of this [missing] material is not subsequently recovered… Sometimes material is found 
which had not been reported missing.”b Most recently, at the July 2009 G8 summit in L’Aquila, 
Italy, President Obama pressed his Prague agenda for confronting nuclear terrorism, announcing 
“an international effort to secure vulnerable nuclear materials within four years, break up black 
markets, detect and intercept materials in transit, and use financial tools to disrupt illicit trade in 
nuclear materials.”6
The desire and the ability to acquire and construct nuclear weapons exist in conjunction with ter-
rorists groups’ openly-stated intent to detonate such weapons. Al Qaeda has expressed interest in 
acquiring nuclear weapons. In 1993, members met with Salah Abdel al-Mobruk, a military officer 
and former Sudanese government minister, who reportedly offered to supply the terrorist orga-
nization with weapons-grade uranium in exchange for $1.5 million. In August 2001, Osama bin 
b  During 2004-2007 there was a 75% increase of non-recovered lost or stolen materials, IAEA, Illicit Trafficking 
Database, Fact Sheet
“The probability of a nuclear weapon one day going off in an American city 
cannot be calculated, but it is larger than it was five years ago.”
–  A. Carter, M.M. May, Center for International Security and Cooperation, June 2007.
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Laden met with two former Pakistani nuclear officials to find out if they would help recruit Paki-
stani scientists with nuclear weapons expertise.7 There is little question that if terrorists groups 
acquired nuclear weapons they would not hesitate to use them.
Construction of a nuclear weapon 
The 1945 Manhattan Project required an interdisciplinary team of scientists and weapons experts. 
Today, nuclear weapons experts unanimously agree that the scientific knowledge necessary to 
construct nuclear weapons is not a significant impediment to nuclear terrorism. Much of the basic 
science and technical knowledge necessary to construct a nuclear weapon is widely understood 
and publicly available.8 INDs can be constructed from fissile materials such as highly enriched 
uranium (HEU) and Plutonium (Pu). It is easier to make a crude IND with HEU.9, 10 According 
to IAEA, a small quantity of HEU, 25 kilograms, would suffice to construct a nuclear weapon.11 c 
Furthermore, despite the considerable level of technical skills and specialists required to construct 
an IND, some weapons such as a gun-type deviced may not pose the same technical barriers nor 
require the assembly of a large scientific team.12 
Nuclear weapons experts unanimously agree the largest obstacle to nuclear terrorism is the acqui-
sition of nuclear weapons or the fissile materials needed to construct an IND. Terrorist groups 
would need either to steal a nuclear weapon from a nation-state’s nuclear arsenals or acquire the 
fissile materials to assemble a crude IND. Terrorist organizations likely do not have the capability 
to develop fissile materials on their own at this time; however acquiring highly enriched materials 
is certainly within the realm of possibility. 
Acquisition of nuclear weapons or fissile material 
After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, political and economic instability threatened the 
security of the former state’s vast nuclear weapons and fissile material stockpiles, opening poten-
tial pathways to their acquisition by terrorist groups. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduc-
tion program (also known as the 1991 Nunn-Lugar Act) has provided approximately $7 billion of 
financial and technological assistance to Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union 
to identify, deactivate, dispose of, and secure the Cold War’s nuclear arsenal. Notwithstanding 
c  25 kg of HEU is about the size of a grapefruit and 8 kg is about the size of a soda can. National Nuclear Security 
Administration. (2007, January). Office of Global Threat Reduction Strategic Plan, 2. Retrieved from: http://nnsa.
energy.gov/nuclear_nonproliferation/documents/GTRI_StrategicPlan.pdf. 
d  A gun-type weapon is the simplest nuclear bomb to build. HEU material is fired down a gun barrel into a ring of 
HEU creating a critical mass and triggering the detonation. The ‘Hiroshima’ WW II bomb was a gun-type device. 
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significant accomplishments, progress has been slow and incomplete; not all targeted sites have 
implemented security upgrades. Furthermore, large quantities of nuclear material stored at Rus-
sian facilities with inadequate security are not part of the U.S.-Russian cooperative security agree-
ment.13 The enormous quantity and geographic distribution of remaining HEU used in facilities 
such as research reactors, in Russia and other countries, including those of the former Soviet 
Union, pose a significant threat for theft or diversion.14 According to a Harvard University report 
commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI): 
Real risks remain, from persistent under-funding of nuclear security systems, weak nuclear 
security regulations, widespread corruption, and conscript guard forces rife with hazing 
and suicide, coupled with threats ranging from surprise attack by scores of heavily armed 
terrorists to sophisticated insider theft conspiracies.15
 Unless the United States and Russia jointly embrace a much more aggressive timetable for reduc-
ing their nuclear arsenals, it is likely to be decades before the volume of fissile material contained 
in existing warheads ceases to be a concern. Russia currently has about 14,000 total warheads, 
the U.S. about 10,500.16 Even before Presidents Obama and Medvedev announced new, more 
ambitious objectives for arsenal reductions in May 2009, both countries faced huge backlogs in 
dismantling those warheads already slated for elimination and disposing of their fissile material. 
In the United States, the timeframe extends beyond 2030, in Russia possibly even later.17
The security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is of equal (if not greater) concern, given the chronic 
political instability in that nation, evidence that Al Qaeda’s base of operations is in Pakistan, the 
increasing incidence of terrorist acts against domestic targets, and the destabilizing presence of 
the Taliban inside Pakistan’s borders. Since the end of 2002, North Korea reversed previous com-
mitments to abandon its nuclear program and restarted facilities it previously had shut down.18 
Recent nuclear testing activitye and announcements of creating “nuclear deterrent” further indi-
cate the Pyongyang government’s intentions to continue its nuclear-capacity build up, and thus, 
e   May 25th, North Korea defied world powers and carried out a second underground test of a nuclear bomb Russian 
officials said was comparable to those that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki. MSNBC. (2009, May 25). North 
Korea conducts powerful nuclear test. Retrieved from: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30921379/. Soon after the test, the 
UN Security Council unanimously condemned the DPRK’s provocative behavior. NTI. (2009, June 25). Issue Brief: 
North Korea’s Nuclear Test and its Aftermath: Coping with the Fallout. Retrieved from www.nti.org/e_research/
e3_north_korea_nuclear_test.html.
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poses a “grave threat” as described by President Obama.19 U.S. intelligence analysts do not believe 
that Iran—although getting close—has yet achieved the ability to produce highly enriched ura-
nium. The U.S. government is extremely concerned about nuclear security in these regions. 
Experts believe that over 50 nations, beyond those previously mentioned, maintain poorly pro-
tected fissile material stockpiles.20 Security at many storage sites, according to the NTI, consists 
of “no more than a night watchman and a chain link fence.”21 The authors of Securing the Bomb 
2008 described an armed break-in at a South African facility where hundreds of kilograms of 
HEU are stored, the arrest of a Russian colonel for soliciting bribes to overlook violations of 
nuclear security rules, and other security breaches that suggest an increased possibility of nuclear 
materials reaching terrorists’ hands.22
When these security concerns are read alongside the bipartisan September 11 Commission’s 2005 
report, which gave the U.S. government’s efforts to secure weapons of mass destruction a grade 
of “D,”23 it becomes clear that inadequate security barriers for nuclear materials provide opportu-
nities that can connect nuclear materials to terrorists’ hands. Preventing the movement of small 
amounts of nuclear materials across borders has proven to be exceedingly challenging. Materials 
can be smuggled across borders in various transportation methods, such as: being carried in per-
sonal cars, walked across, hidden in trucks, or delivered by a small covert boats navigating below 
radar surveillance. In some areas where border security is imperfect, materials likely could be 
transported across with little effort.
Preventing Importation of Nuclear Materials
Since nuclear stockpiles in America are, theoretically, stored under extremely high security, it is 
thought that terrorists would need to acquire fissile material or pre-assembled bombs abroad, and 
transport those items into the United States intact or in ready-to-assemble pieces.24 The Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS), operating through its Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) and Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) units, has the primary responsibility 
for ensuring that nuclear material does not enter the United States through hundreds of seaports 
and formal border crossings or the thousands of miles of unguarded borders with Canada and 
Mexico.f CBP employs thousands of uniformed and plain-clothes border guards and port security 
f  The Department of Energy also has significant responsibilities in this area, mainly related to the scanning—in foreign 
ports—of cargo containers that are loaded onto ships headed for the United States. An overview of the “Megaports 
Initiative” is at www.nnsa.energy.gov/nuclear_nonproliferation/1641.htm.
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officers. The agency also gathers intelligence to flag suspicious cargo, helps shippers and importers 
employ minimal cargo security policies and procedures, helps port officials prevent unauthorized 
access to sensitive port facilities, and deploys military-inspired surveillance technology to monitor 
the northern and southern borders.
One of CBP’s primary jobs is to scan (or ensure that foreign port officials scan) cargo contain-
ers as they are loaded onto U.S.-bound ships and as they are unloaded from ships in U.S. ports. 
DNDO is responsible for procuring radiation detectors and other high-tech scanning equip-
ment that can sniff out even heavily-shielded plutonium or HEU hidden in a cargo container, 
oil tanker, imported car or any other item entering U.S. territory. DNDO has entered into multi-
billion dollar contracts to develop cutting edge radiation scanning technology. 
DHS’s multi-pronged efforts have produced significant improvements in supply chain security. 
The 2008 “report card” on the 9/11 Commission Recommendations from the Partnership for 
a Secure America gave U.S. cargo security efforts a “B.”25 However, a number of recent GAO 
reports have noted continuing deficiencies in CBP’s programs to keep nuclear material out of 
U.S.-bound containers and from crossing the land borders.26,  27 These reports also have indicated 
that DNDO was far behind schedule and that consequently, CBP might not be able to deploy 
more sensitive and accurate radiation detectors until 2012.28 A recent announcement from DHS 
stated that it will not be able to meet Congress’s 2012 deadline for 100% screening of U.S.-bound 
cargo containers.29
These observations, coupled with the readily available knowledge of how to construct a nuclear 
weapon, unchecked access to inadequately secure nuclear stockpiles, porous borders, unchecked 
cargo containers, and other subjective information substantiate the threat of nuclear terrorism.
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The Detonation of a 10 Kiloton (Kt)  
Improvised Nuclear Device 
Response Issues
Under the U.S. National Preparedness Guidelines, National Planning Scenario 1 describes the 
detonation of a 10 Kt IND in a large U.S. city. g Although the planning scenario is set within a sin-
gle metropolitan area, the overall impact and response would not be a local event, by any means. 
A nuclear detonation of that magnitude would most assuredly be a catastrophic regional event. 
It would demand a broad response, involving jurisdictions that are far from ground zero as an 
exodus of survivors from the impacted local region and the threat of radioactive fallout are real-
ized. Yet regional governance in the United States is the exception rather than the rule. Although 
a few major metropolitan areas have genuine metropolitan governments and interstate compacts 
exist for purposes of economic development and mutual aid, there are no existing metropolitan 
or interstate frameworks capable of planning for or coordinating the necessary responses to the 
detonation of an IND.
A major challenge will certainly be the unprecedented scale and scope of emergency operations, 
starting with the mobilization and coordination of existing regional resources and the need for 
a workforce to be brought into the area to support response operations. In the early hours of 
response and mass casualty management, local incident managers would need to organize and 
carry out operations on the assumption that significant federal resources would not be available 
for one to three days. Their immediate concerns will be maximizing survival, rapidly obtaining 
situational awareness, undertaking rapid damage and needs assessments, and maintaining social 
order. These activities will place a huge burden on the overwhelmed local jurisdictions, states and 
neighboring regions. 
In order to maximize the impact of limited healthcare resources, it will be essential for officials 
to coordinate the various assets of the health and public health systems. They will need to know 
the real-time status of medical care facilities, Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and fire agen-
cies, law enforcement officials, public health responders, private sector entities, and volunteer 
assets within the region. It is likely that certain potential issues will hamper these coordination 
g  The fifteen “National Planning Scenarios” are included in the “National Preparedness Guidelines” promulgated 
pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8. Retrieved from www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_
Preparedness_Guidelines.pdf. The 10-kiloton parameter for the IND is set forth at www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/
mgmtrpts/OIG_06-07_Nov05.pdf.
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efforts, including inoperative communications equipment, poor visibility and access due to dust 
and debris, panic and the limited availability of workers willing to place themselves at unknown 
risk to carry out response operations. There are numerous variables that will challenge the ability 
of a region to respond to an event of this scale. 
Impact on Population and Infrastructure
The catastrophic impact of a 10 Kt nuclear detonation differs from other large scale disasters not 
only in magnitude, but also with regards to the high incidence of burns and traumatic injuries 
that will overwhelm the capacities of local and regional medical care to provide assistance. The 
immense energy discharged upon a nuclear detonation would cause an enormous loss of life, 
widespread destruction of infrastructure and the contamination of large geographic areas with 
fallout. The destructive forces are the initial fireball at the epicenter of detonation, followed by 
blast forces, prompt radiation and thermal heat. The heat would vaporize all close-by matter, 
including soil and water, and lift it into the hallmark ‘mushroom cloud.’ Half of the total energy 
from the detonation would occur in the form of blast forces, one third as thermal energy and 
approximately one sixth as radiation. This final category would include both initial or “prompt” 
radiation (5%) and delayed radiation or fallout (10%) that would last for minutes to years as it 
decayed.30 Close to the point of detonation, blast forces and thermal effects would be fatal to all 
persons, and cause near-total destruction. However, the destructiveness of those forces would 
diminish with distance from ground zero (see Figure 1, page 14). The same is true for the prompt 
radiation released during the first minutes following detonation; the intensity and lethality would 
diminish quickly with increasing distance from the point of detonation.31 Depending on their 
proximity to the detonation, victims may experience radiation effects ranging from rapid death to 
only delayed, minor sickness. Even with a strong to moderate dose, some victims who become ill 
could survive with proper medical care. While some effects of radiation can be immediate, many 
of the medical consequences would not manifest themselves for days to weeks, or even years.
Health risks from prompt radiation will exist within approximately 20 kilometers, and longer-
lasting radiation in the form of fallout particles will reach the ground downwind from the detona-
tion site. As the cloud of radiation-containing debris moves downwind, fallout will contaminate 
A combination of rapid sheltering-in-place followed by informed evacuation 
would likely maximize chances of survival and recovery. 
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tissue, penetrate thin walls and glass, and contaminate soil, exposed food and the water supply.32 
The fallout is dictated by wind and weather variations and can create a zone of high radioactivity 
as far as 100 miles downwind.33 Life saving activities likely will focus on placing the public out of 
harm’s way either by evacuation or sheltering-in-place. 
Distance, shielding, and time are critical variables in determining the nature and severity of injuries 
the population would sustain from the blast wave, heat, prompt radiation or fallout. A person in a 
basement or reinforced building might survive, whereas a person in the open might not. Similarly, 
someone far from the blast would be less likely to be injured than someone in closer proximity to it. 
A combination of rapid sheltering-in-place followed by an informed evacuation would likely 
reduce exposure to radiation and injury and maximize chances of survival and recovery. “Shelter” 
in this sense does not need to be a formal structure built for this purpose; being in a building or 
a basement would provide significantly more protection than being in the open or in a car. An 
“informed evacuation” implies that a person understands both when to leave a shelter, and which 
direction they should head to minimize their exposure to radioactive fallout and other hazards. 
While many variables contribute to determining how best to combine the efforts of sheltering 
and evacuating, experts now believe that prompt sheltering for several hours would save the most 
lives, since the most lethal radiation levels from fallout decay rapidly over several hours after a 
detonation. After that, depending on the type of shelter, many would benefit from quickly leaving 
the area and avoiding exposure to residual fallout radiation. 
In addition to an informed public, maximum survivability depends significantly on responders 
and medical care providers having a keen understanding of the types of injuries that may occur at 
various distances from the detonation and of the geographic zones in which victims might be able 
to survive. It also depends upon the immediate dissemination of public health messages inform-
ing displaced people and individuals needing decontamination where, how and when to find and 
get to shelters and other functional facilities. While this sounds reasonable to accomplish, the 
technical and logistical barriers to determining safe verses unsafe zones and identifying functional 
facilities after a detonation are massive; it would require unprecedented planning efforts and 
effective accumulation and analysis of essential data to be successful. 
Regardless of how the blast destruction, ensuing fires and radiation spread out from the detona-
tion point, there would exist an area—a gray zone—between the areas that are obliterated and 
those that offer reasonable opportunities for survival without extraordinary measures. Survivors in 
this gray zone would experience a range of medical issues from trauma and burns to entrapment 
and radiation exposure. While some in the gray zone undoubtedly would sustain fatal injuries, 
many would be able to survive depending on the prompt actions of public health officials and the 
public to carry out protective actions. 
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Figure 1-2. 10Kt Detonation Effects; Times Square, New York City
Ring model and data source: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Presentation-409771
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Survival in the Gray Zone
Planning Guidelines for Life Saving Opportunities 
In addition to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory’s detonation-effects modeling in New 
York, recent modeling of the effects of nuclear detonations in several American metropolitan 
areas by Drs. William Bell and Cham Dallas also suggest that lives can be saved and recovery 
efforts maximized through prompt actions of those in the gray zone. The gray zone is descrip-
tive of areas where non-lethal injuries can be expected and survival is possible, but by no means 
guaranteed. The availability of basic healthcare treatments within a reasonable amount of time is 
essential to maximize survival in this group of injured survivors. Understanding zones of different 
injuries would result in a more effective targeted response. 
There is no way to accurately predict how many victims would be exposed to more than one effect 
(blast, thermal burns, prompt radiation and fallout) of the nuclear detonation, but it is clear that 
a person exposed to multiple effects would have a far worse prognosis than someone exposed to 
only one of those effects.h The goal of taking urgent action after a detonation would be to limit 
the exposure to as many of the hazards as possible, as much as possible. 
No amount of modeling can accurately capture all of the variables that would exist when a deto-
nation occurred in an urban environment. The concentric circles of damage that are commonly 
seen on maps illustrating the effects of a detonation are based upon data from cold war era nuclear 
weapons tests that the U.S. conducted in open desert areas containing few water bodies, build-
ings or other structures. It is very unlikely that the effects of an IND detonation in a dense urban 
area would result in areas of damage that were as clearly demarcated and which could be easily 
defined. The inability to confidently predict distinct zones of anticipated injuries and damage 
would greatly complicate the efforts of responders. However, response planners can adopt the 
concept of survival in these gray zones and focus efforts on rapidly identifying appropriate areas 
for minimizing fatalities and suffering.





Public Health and Medical Care Systems 
The public health response to a nuclear detonation will have to begin immediately after a detona-
tion. Appropriate authorities will have to make time-sensitive decisions and rapidly communicate 
with the public in harm’s way in order to facilitate evacuation, sheltering, decontamination, and 
mass medical and mental health care. In an event of this magnitude and urgency, a regionally 
distributed network of public health stakeholders would face even greater challenges speaking 
with one voice and communicating emergency instruction to the public, than would be the case 
in other emergencies. Therefore, risk communication plans for such an incident must already be 
in place, and they must be familiar to those who are responsible for providing these services to 
the public. 
The Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) recently published a status 
report summarizing state and local preparedness capacities six years after the initiation of the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
Program.34 The report, a compilation of survey responses from members of four major orga-
nizations—ASTHO, the Association of Public Health Laboratories, the Council of State and 
Territorial Epidemiologists, and the National Association of County and City Health Officials—
found that six years of CDC funding of preparedness planning had produced many improve-
ments, but that critical gaps remained. Many local health departments lack plans for mass patient 
care and fatality management and face inadequate staffing and work-force development. One 
third of respondents indicated a need for improvements in medical and hospital surge capacity, 
radiation response, and disaster recovery.35
Hospital and Healthcare Systems 
The loss of healthcare resources and emergency response capacity in the affected area would 
substantially complicate response and recovery operations. Hospitals remaining open following 
an IND detonation can expect a tremendous, unprecedented surge of patients with some com-
bination of burns, multiple traumas from the blast effects and radiation sickness from the high 
prompt radiation dose. In addition, it should be expected that large numbers of uninjured or 
mildly affected individuals would rush to healthcare facilities seeking to confirm potential radia-
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tion exposure. While most studies do not support the notion that populations panic during and 
after large-scale disasters, we propose that “radiation panic” may be a potential phenomenon in 
the aftermath of an IND attack.
The demand for assessment and treatment would overwhelm available supplies, personnel, phar-
maceuticals, and hospital space in the nation’s urban centers or the regions that surround them. At 
present, hospitals, EMS systems and other healthcare resources do not have the capability to han-
dle the extreme volume of patients that would follow a nuclear detonation.36 Given the likelihood 
that such an attack would damage health care facilities, damage the infrastructure and impede 
the delivery of health and first responder services, and reduce the number of available healthcare 
providers, preparedness planners have not adequately accounted for the unprecedented challenges 
that will complicate healthcare delivery. An innovative approach is needed to provide medical 
treatment to the large number of people sickened and injured by a nuclear explosion. While the 
DHS Concept of Operations document details an organizational model for positioning triage and 
treatment resources for victims both inside and outside of the gray zone, this type of theoretical 
plan will have little value if it has not been exercised before a disaster occurs.37
Some hospitals and emergency response agencies have resisted developing genuine nuclear pre-
paredness plans because they perceive a combination of overwhelming demands and few work-
able solutions. A report from the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center (UPMC) notes, “Hospitals often do not have the time or resources to undertake com-
prehensive disaster preparedness planning, and some are unaware of their presumed roles and 
responsibilities within larger community disaster plans.”38 The paper argues that with 30% of 
hospitals losing money, hospitals are simply not likely to allocate enough resources to disaster pre-
paredness. For example, a 2006 survey of 19 acute care hospitals in the Maryland region revealed 
that only 11 maintained a dedicated reserve supply of pharmaceuticals to treat radiological event 
victims.39 And the total supplies of these materials in the 11 stockpiles would only represent a 
minute fraction of what might be needed in the event of a proximal IND detonation. The survey 
also notes that, “pharmaceutical preparedness for radiological incidents remains least addressed 
at the regional level. Limited supplies of potassium iodide and chelating agents [useful in some 
types of radiation and nuclear incidents] for radiation exposure were found regionally.”40
The availability of basic healthcare treatments within a reasonable amount of 
time is essential to maximize survival.
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Congress created the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) in 1999 to supplement and replenish 
state and local medical and pharmaceutical resources and ensure availability and rapid deploy-
ment of life-saving medical countermeasures during and after a disaster. Most hospitals expect to 
receive emergency supplies within 48 hours from this federally coordinated stockpile, although 
it is uncertain if, under the conditions that would exist after an IND detonation, this timeline 
could be met. The Center for Biosecurity study notes that supplies from the SNS should theoreti-
cally be available within 12 hours.i However, the Maryland pharmaceutical preparedness survey 
indicates that “[the] logistical challenges of the actual delivery, distribution, and dispensing to 
people in need may contribute to delays.”41 The logistic and distribution challenges following an 
IND attack would likely dwarf the circumstances which impeded relief efforts in the Haiti earth-
quake of January 2010. In short, local authorities and medical professionals simply cannot rely on 
immediate availability of state and federal resources in the aftermath of a disaster and must plan 
to function independently for an extended period.
Following an IND detonation, many hospitals also would face severe shortages of the specialized 
equipment and highly-trained health care personnel they would need in order to provide care for 
burn and trauma victims and patients requiring intensive care and respiratory therapy, not to men-
tion the resources they would need for pharmaceutical intervention and mass decontamination.
According to a 2001 study published in the Annals of Emergency Medicine, 73% of the hospitals 
surveyed believed they were unprepared to handle a nuclear incident.42 This is a critical prepared-
ness gap; according to a 2002 disaster scenario published in the British Medical Journal, a 12.5 
kiloton ground-level explosion in a New York City port would destroy 1,000 hospital beds from 
the blast and contaminate 8,700 more beds with sufficient radiation to cause radiation sickness.43 
According to Dr. Dallas, the effect of a nuclear detonation on healthcare resources in the United 
States would be devastating. He commented, “The nationwide trend of locating a majority of the 
major urban healthcare institutions in downtown areas would result in a staggering loss of the 
total institutional health care delivery following nuclear weapons use.”44 Dr. Dallas estimates that 
if terrorists successfully detonated a 20Kt bomb in New York City, the resulting fallout could—
depending on the wind patterns–wipe out most of the healthcare systems in Manhattan.45 Even 
with a 10 Kt IND, it is clear that a significant percentage of healthcare facilities, depending on 
location, would be destroyed or dysfunctional at varying levels of capacity and capabilities. 
The magnitude of the effects on healthcare resources in other cities would be similar. A 20 Kt 
bomb in the Washington D.C. area would affect more than half of the hospitals in the D.C. area. 
i  SNS Mission statement is to release from federal SNS and deliver to State SNS Coordinators within 12 hours; States 
will then deliver to local SNS Program for local DOH to receive and distribute to general public within 48 hours.
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However, in Chicago and Atlanta, an explosion of that size device would leave many suburban 
hospitals physically unaffected and functional,46, 47 albeit completely overwhelmed by patients. 
Suburban hospitals also might be less prepared than urban academic medical centers to handle 
the tremendous influx of trauma patients and patients suffering from radiation poisoning. With 
healthcare resources in an entire region severely compromised, it is unclear where patients caught 
in the gray zone would be able to go for lifesaving help.
First Responders
First responders after a nuclear incident include personnel with public safety, rescue, emergency 
medical, life safety, critical infrastructure, and public health responsibilities. A small nuclear deto-
nation would completely overwhelm even the most sophisticated and capable urban first response 
systems. Testifying in the Senate about nuclear preparedness in April 2008, John Gibb, the Direc-
tor of the New York State Emergency Management Office said:
There is no ready system in place or planned for that would result in the victims of this type 
of event receiving pre-hospital or definitive care in any reasonable time frame.48
A reliance on either EMS or hospitals to absorb the surge in demand for medical care during a 
nuclear disaster is unrealistic. The dangers associated with responding to a nuclear incident would 
far exceed the typical risk associated with being a first responder, which may limit the number 
of personnel willing to report for duty. In addition to widespread fires, poor visibility, and moun-
tains of dangerous debris, radiation levels will severely limit the time responders could be in the 
affected areas and further compromise rescue and recovery operations. The typical occupational 
guidelines for radiation exposure will be difficult or impossible to follow after a nuclear detona-
tion. For example, Gibb notes that New York State typically does not expect first responders to 
expose themselves to more than a minimal dose of radiation during rescue operations. However, 
following a nuclear detonation Gibb argues that there would be life-saving and security missions 
in areas exposed to drastically higher radiation levels—levels that could have serious or even fatal 
health consequences for the first responders. Gibb argues, “We need to re-examine and provide 
guidance and alternative approaches to federal, state and local emergency planners that will allow 
us to address this issue.”49 In other words, the public and government must ensure that IND 
event preparedness models provide guidance to incident commanders in balancing the risks to 
first responders against the need to carry out lifesaving operations. They must develop such guide-
lines—and others that address the unique challenges of nuclear terrorism—in consultation with 
the people whom they’re expecting to place themselves in harm’s way.
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Patient Triage Systems and Altered Standards of Medical Care
Decision making to determine which victims will receive immediate versus delayed care is an 
additional special medical resource in casualty management. Following a nuclear detonation, the 
sheer enormity in numbers of victims within the context of limited resources would become 
immensely challenging and would require very different approaches from current standard triage 
protocols. The level of medical care, where available at all, most likely would be substantially lower 
than expected in other emergencies.
A 2008 GAO report also highlights the need to adopt alternative medical standards during a mass 
casualty event that overwhelms available resources. The report notes that some states had “not begun 
work on altered standards of care guidelines [italics added], or had not completed drafting guidelines, 
because of the difficulty of addressing the medical, ethical, and legal issues involved…”50 It is clear 
that limited resources would make delivering best-practice medical care impossible. 
The United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) triage model is designed 
for small events and is posted with the following disclaimer: “Caution: Algorithm guideline mod-
ifications will be required in mass casualty events.”51 At present there is no generally-accepted tri-
age protocol that accounts for the severe resource shortages that would exist following a nuclear 
event. In fact, Drs. David Cone and Kristi Koenig of Yale University claim “no mass casualty tri-
age scheme has become accepted as a gold standard.”52 However, they propose a very simplistic 
triage system to be used following a nuclear detonation that deserves some attention; Drs. Cone 
and Koenig propose a system where patients are classified based on their ability to independently 
walk, breathe and follow commands.53 Although their system is not comprehensive and does 
not attempt to address the full array of medical, ethical and legal issues that medical staff would 
encounter when allocating scarce resources, it does provide a basis to prioritize patients in the 
immediate aftermath of a nuclear event. Preparedness efforts must be attentive to the realities of 
extraordinarily high need and extraordinarily limited resources, or medical facilities would simply 
not function in the wake of a nuclear detonation.
Workforce Absenteeism 
One of the most difficult factors to account for in drafting a comprehensive nuclear disaster 
response plan would be the lack of information regarding who actually would report to work 
after this type of incident. Personnel from first responders to physicians and city emergency man-
agement employees would confront competing priorities. Many would have to choose between 
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reporting to work and attempting to take care of their family, friends and property. While most 
emergency services employees report a high level of commitment to service, people have not 
always reported to work in past disasters. 
There is limited understanding of responder willingness to report to work following a nuclear 
detonation, yet some conclusions can be drawn from a Columbia University NCDP survey of 
EMS providers that inquired about workforce willingness to respond to a radiological dispersal 
device (RDD or “dirty bomb”) event. The 2003 survey concluded that only 83.4% of providers 
would be able to report to work and only 73.8% of providers would be willing to report to work 
following an RDD explosion in a school that injured 500 children.54 While these data indicate 
that many EMS workers would accept the personal risks of reporting to work following an RDD 
incident, they also emphasize that more than a fourth of EMS might not report to work due to 
logistical issues relating to family or home needs, or a personal fear of becoming injured or sick. It 
is important to acknowledge that the perceived personal risks of responding to a nuclear detona-
tion are likely to be much greater than those associated with responding to an RDD, and that the 
number of responders unable or unwilling to report to work following the detonation of an IND 
would certainly be much higher. 
A 2008 GAO report noted that states have similar concerns about hospital staff shortages. The 
report notes:
While 19 of 20 states we surveyed reported that they could increase numbers of hospital beds 
in a mass casualty event, some state officials were concerned about staffing these beds because 
of current shortages in medical professionals, including nurses and physicians.55
In the context of a nuclear disaster this assessment indicates that even if the hospitals in the gray 
zone, where the infrastructure may be physically intact and functional, could accommodate a 
patient surge, hospitals would likely lack the medical personnel to care for the casualties.
While this information about medical personnel’s willingness to work may seem to cast doubt on 
the efficacy of medical preparedness efforts in general, the 2003 NCDP survey cited previously 
includes several statistics that show otherwise. For example, 83% of EMS providers surveyed 
cited a “sense of responsibility” and 77% of EMS providers cited the “ability to provide care” as 
the primary reasons to report to work. Of those who stated that they would not report to work, 
44% cited “concern for family” as their foremost reason.56 This may indicate that if a disaster plan 
includes innovative approaches that provide special protection to the families of medical person-
nel, some portion of those who otherwise would stay at home, may report to work. 
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As a regional event, an IND detonation will severely challenge the ability and willingness of 
emergency personnel to report for duty. A recent study by the NCDP explored the barriers to 
hospital employees reporting for duty during a public health emergency, and found that the most 
significant barriers included the need to care for a child or adult at home, and a fear for the safety 
of themselves and their family57. Many of these issues will be deal-breakers for all types of emer-
gency personnel at all levels. As such, it is important for emergency planners to factor extreme 
levels of absenteeism at all levels into the region’s emergency operations plan.
An Effective Public Response Requires Preparedness
The American public is concerned about terrorists exploding a nuclear bomb on United States 
soil.58 In a series of nationwide focus groups, conducted by the Saga Foundation, Americans cited 
nuclear terrorism as a “top fear” and believed that if a terrorist organization acquired nuclear 
weapons, it would use them.59 Furthermore, researchers Wray, Becker, et al. (2008), found that 
faced with the threat of a public health emergency, the public would respond by “seeking pro-
tective information and taking self-protective action.”60 These findings suggest that the public’s 
ability to receive, understand, and believe emergency messages, and then act upon them would 
significantly enhance survivability and health outcomes. A recently released DHS Concepts of 
Operation guide states “the most effective life-saving opportunities…in the first 60 minutes [after 
a nuclear detonation]…would be the decision to safely shelter or evacuate people in expected 
fallout zones.” 
Are concerned about the 
possibility of a nuclear attack 
on U.S. soil
United States will experience a 
nuclear attack within 5 years
Terrorist organizations like 
Al Qaeda will acquire nuclear 
weapons over the next decade
If a terrorist organization 
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Distance and shielding, previously described within this paper, are essential concepts in strategies to 
maximize survival and mitigate illness, yet these personal risk reduction and protective actions are not 
well understood by the general public. As many as 90% of the respondents in Wray and Becker’s study 
stated they may not follow instructions to shelter-in-place even if they receive the message to do so.61 j
In the minutes and hours after the detonation of an IND, the public would need to make a few 
key decisions in order to maximize their chances of surviving and minimize their injuries and 
long-term health effects:
1. Is it better to evacuate now or later?
2. If I stay put, how should I shelter and decontaminate myself to prevent further injury?
3. When I do evacuate, where should I go to avoid placing myself at an increased risk 
from fallout?
Individuals will very likely need to make these decisions in the absence of official directions. If 
local health officials are to dramatically increase the percentage of affected people who can sur-
vive, they must make the public aware of the benefits of these initial life-saving responses actions 
and of knowing what to do in an emergency. Despite the benefits that these simple protective 
measures can have, it seems that the widely-known images of the nuclear devastation in Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki, and subsequent fictionalized portrayals of nuclear conflict in movies and 
television-program images of total nuclear devastation have led people to conclude either that 
preparedness is impossible or that the federal government already must have done everything in 
its power to protect the country. Both assumptions are inaccurate.
In the United States, virtually no public education has taken place about what an individual 
should do in the event of a nuclear detonation, although there is urgent and critical need for such 
Survival in the ‘gray zone,’ while by no means assured, will be highly dependent 
on effective pre-event planning – including evacuation and shelter-in-place 
plans communicated to the general public and practiced.
– Dr. Irwin Redlener, May, 2008
j  The status of family members, especially children in school and knowledge of preparedness plans for family members 
in other locations are determining factors for adherence to shelter-in-place directives.
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education, especially for those living in potential target areas. Also lacking are pre-developed, 
exercised and well-tested communication plans to deliver rapid information from officials to the 
public following a nuclear incident. 
The advocacy group Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR), in a 2006 report about America’s 
preparedness for nuclear terrorism, noted the absence of either “a central coordinating authority 
empowered to immediately step in to direct the response and rescue efforts”62 or any “communi-
cation with the public on preparedness for nuclear terrorism...”63 The decentralized responsibility 
for and lack of public communication about nuclear preparedness highlighted by the PSR report 
might help explain the previously-discussed public unawareness of nuclear terrorism preparedness.
A public education campaign that addressed these issues could save lives and reduce injury in the 
gray zone by empowering the public to initiate life-saving actions without the need for official 
advice, which may never arrive. Immediate protective actions in the first moments after a detona-
tion are critical. Considering that it might be impossible to get emergency messages to the public 
after a detonation, it is sensible to equip the public now with basic information on how to best 
protect themselves and their family should they ever confront this type of disaster. 
Federal Emergency Response
As previously mentioned, a nuclear detonation will have significant regional level impacts that 
cut across city and state boundaries. Consequently, regional resources will be critical in the hours 
before federal assistance arrives. And once external resources do arrive, coordination among local, 
regional, federal and other assets will require highly complex systems-integration capacities in a dynamic 
and unpredictably expanding scenario. 
In the earliest phases of an IND response, the federal government could only make limited 
resources available to augment local and state response capabilities. Local and state first respond-
ers and medical professionals cannot assume that the federal government would be able to materi-
ally support their local activities for the first few days. For example, even when the Department of 
Homeland Security activated all of its more than 50 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT)j 
to provide urgent medical care to victims of Hurricane Katrina, the assistance was insufficient to 
accommodate the patient load.64 A nuclear detonation would produce a vastly greater number of 
patients with more complex and life-threatening injuries. The need for decontamination would 
further complicate an already daunting medical challenge. Therefore, local healthcare profession-
als should not assume that federal response teams would be able to provide the needed surge 
k  DMAT teams are civilian teams of medical professionals and support staff, administered through HHS via the 
National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)
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capacity. Furthermore, although HHS also operates National Pharmacy Response Teams (con-
sisting of pharmacists, pharmacy students and pharmacy technicians) to help rapidly distribute 
medication in a disaster region, these resources would be grossly insufficient to accommodate the 
increased demand following a nuclear detonation. 
In the U.S. federal system, state and local governments and non-profit organizations always have 
shouldered the primary preparedness and response burden. Operating under the principle of 
“Home Rule,” state and local authorities maintain the vast majority of power and control over a 
disaster response and coordinate, in their area, the rescue and recovery operations as well as the 
post-disaster cleanup. As multiple assessments of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
(FEMA) administration of the Stafford Act have noted, obtaining federal disaster assistance can 
be a cumbersome, protracted process. States must first conduct assessments, verify resources spent, 
and then declare that they need federal help. FEMA must review such requests and the President 
must declare a disaster before the federal government can provide disaster aid.65, 66 For the federal 
government to provide an immediate response, Congress needs to revise the protocols governing 
presidential disaster declarations so that there will be an automatic Presidential declaration upon 
any nuclear detonation. It is not known if such protocol revisions already exist, however.
A nuclear detonation would almost assuredly overwhelm local, state and regional resources to the 
point where they would struggle to provide an accurate assessment of the situation. It also would 
invoke responses from an unprecedented number of local and regional and extra-regional agencies 
and personnel and trigger deployment of multiple federal agencies in the interest of national secu-
rity and law enforcement. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the designated lead federal 
agency for the investigation of all terrorism incidents. In addition to traditional disaster response 
agencies such as FEMA and HHS, specialized civilian and military support teams have been estab-
lished to provide technical expertise to federal responders. The response would undoubtedly be 
complicated and protracted as federal assets, state responders and local agencies converged to assess 
the situation, communicated with the public, coordinated an evacuation, issued emergency instruc-
tions, established health care systems, and began an investigation. Absent substantial pre-planning, 
the amassing of numerous federal and local agencies following a nuclear incident would affect exist-
ing local command and coordination plans and create confusion as to how these various agencies 
should interact. 
Some emergency preparedness advocates argue that the federal government should pre-assign the 
military an increased role in the response to a large disaster as they already possess the advanced 
field capabilities in the areas of damage assessment, search and rescue, transportation, logistics, 
communications, medical care, and in maintaining order.67 Recent announcements from the 
Department of Defense (DoD) indicate that steps are being taken to provide this type of assis-
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tance with the development of domestic Rapid Reaction Forces. Initial reports indicate that nearly 
5,000 active duty troops are available for this purpose at this time, with the number expected to 
grow to 20,000 by 2011. These troops would work under the United States Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM), established in 2002 to support the homeland security mission and civil sup-
port role of the DoD. In addition to the civilian DMAT teams available through HHS, the DoD 
has a robust capability to deliver field medical care through the use of a tiered system intended for 
deployment during operations. These include Battalion Aid Stations, Forward Support Medical 
Battalions, Forward Surgical Teams, and the modular Combat Support Hospitals. While the use 
of these assets remains an option for federal officials, their integration into the civilian healthcare 
system as part of a regional response to an IND event would be challenging without significant 
preplanning. Experience from the 9/11 terrorist attacks demonstrated that under the current sys-
tem it takes at least 3-7 days to authorize and deploy federal active duty or reserve troops.68 It is 
assumed that many of the processes have been streamlined, however, in the subsequent nine years.
To increase the military’s role in domestic emergencies beyond that contemplated for USNORTH-
COM would require a significant reassessment of both policy concerning the use of military forces 
to perform domestic law enforcement functions and the statute that has governed that domain for 
over a century, the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act (PCA). This law generally prohibits the use of the 
military in civilian law enforcement and supports protection of individual civil liberties, although 
relief operations are not restricted under the legislation. The PCA applies to active and reserve 
units of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines but not to the Coast Guard (In 2003, the Coast 
Guard came under the auspices of the Department of Homeland Security). As a rule, a state’s 
National Guard is considered a state asset, i.e., under the command of its own Governor. While a 
state asset, the National Guard is not subject to the limitation of PCA and the Governor may call 
up the Guard for law enforcement activities and other duties upon a disaster. However, in those 
infrequent occurrences when the Guard is federalized by Presidential authority, it is subject to 
the limitations of PCA.69 Furthermore, various federal statutes provide express exceptions to the 
PCA, including upon emergencies involving nuclear materials.70 
The federal government must refine its role in disaster response if the U.S. is to be prepared for deto-
nation of an IND. The current system does not contain surge capacity or provide planning support 
commensurate with the challenges of such a disaster. Given the legal framework of the PCA and 
existing statutory exceptions, legislators and other policymakers need to clarify the potential func-
tions of the U.S. armed forces following an IND detonation. In January 2008, Congress acknowl-
edged the urgency of addressing these issues by mandating the creation of an advisory panel to 
“carry out an assessment of the capabilities of the Department of Defense to provide support to 
United States civil authorities in the event of a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear or high-




The very real threat of nuclear terrorism is evidenced by terrorists’ well-documented desire to use 
nuclear weapons against the United States and the ability to procure, develop and use nuclear 
weapons. Although it is impossible to quantify this threat with any precision, the availability of 
poorly-secured fissile material in many locations, imperfect controls on the entry of people and 
cargo, general knowledge about nuclear fission technology and, as previously discussed, the politi-
cal instability of Pakistan and potential instability of other nuclear states, have led most observ-
ers to believe that the threat is real and imminent enough to demand the highest priority from 
lawmakers and society as a whole. The effects of even a 10 Kt nuclear detonation in an urban 
area would be overwhelming. Yet, although there would be enormous loss of life, housing and 
infrastructure, an IND detonation is a survivable event for many. Well thought out and rehearsed 
disaster response plans could literally make the difference between life and death for hundreds of 
thousands of people. 
Counter-proliferation initiatives, cooperative nuclear security programs, strong supply-chain, 
cargo and border security programs and robust, multi-layered counter-terrorism, intelligence and 
law enforcement programs, collectively provide our best hope of preventing nuclear terrorism in 
the United States. Yet these and other prevention efforts thus far have been limited and met with 
barriers and delayed goals. Equally troubling, prevention programs exist within an environment of 
unstable governments and serious and dangerous trafficking of nuclear materials, technology and 
scientific expertise. As discussed previously, however, no set of prevention efforts is fool-proof, 
and the consequences of a single failure could be disastrous. 
 Senator Joe Lieberman, Chair of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Gov-
ernment Affairs, clearly articulated our responsibility to confront the nuclear threat when he said, 
Al Qaeda has demonstrated a clear intent to develop and use nuclear weapons to achieve its 
violent jihadist goals. This is daunting and jarring information, but it is our responsibility 
to bring it forth and do something about it. Our purpose today is not to encourage unrealis-
tic fear but rather to confront the fearful realities we face in the world today so that we can 
then deal with them in defense of our country and people and our way of life.73 
Senator Lieberman’s statement is an undeniable charge to the United States government and the 
general public. It should be an injunction to emergency planners at all levels to move forward now 
and develop and exercise preparedness and response mitigation plans for potential nuclear terror-
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ist attacks within our country. Elected officials and emergency planners at all levels of government 
must understand the reality of the nuclear terrorism threat and come to grips with the almost 
certain catastrophic effect on a regional population, infrastructure and health, not to mention far 
reaching consequences that include damage to national confidence and psyche as well as a global 
effect. The public and our emergency planners must get beyond Cold War notions of total nuclear 
devastation and adopt planning assumptions around survivability. Our pre-event planning would 
be decisive in determining our response competencies and outcomes should such a dreadful event 
ever occur.
Disaster planning is a core responsibility at all levels of government. In fact, many jurisdictions 
have encouraged their public to prepare for a variety of natural and man-made disasters, including 
an outbreak of pandemic influenza. Moreover many non-government response agencies and pri-
vate sector entities have implemented disaster contingency response plans. Planning for a nuclear 
detonation scenario, however, has not been on the table in any deliberate or sustained way. We 
should follow the logic of prevention and give ourselves the skills to increase our chances of sur-
viving and recovering from an IND disaster as well. It is time to synthesize known threats and 
plausible consequences into action. To this end, the NCDP recommends a range of regionally 
planned IND-specific response strategies, including: 
1. Require all jurisdictions that are federally designated as high risk IND target communi-
ties to develop and sustain appropriate preparedness for possible nuclear terrorism;
2. Strengthen regional alliances and coalitions developed to implement effective 
response strategies;
3. Require all federally funded regional alliances to demonstrate robust plans for region-wide 
health, public health and sheltering response to IND detonation;
4. Provide sufficient funding for all aspects of preparedness for IND terrorism; 
5. Greatly expand capacity of national rescue and recovery efforts, including relevant federal 
agencies, to respond in the event of an IND attack anywhere in the U.S , including spe-
cialized training with respect to functioning in high-level radiation events;
Survivability in the ‘gray zone’ must be a principle guiding response, 
mitigation, and recovery planning at all levels of government and non-
government response agencies.
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6. Clarify incident command roles and operational integration procedures among federal, 
state and local authorities in the event of an IND attack;
7. Ensure that Strategic National Stockpiles of countermeasures—as well as corresponding 
stockpiles on a state level—are relevant for an IND detonation and are scaled up to meet 
the likely demand;
8. Accelerate—and exercise—multi-sector response planning that includes government 
entities, non-governmental organizations and private sector assets;
9. Research and implement strategies designed to communicate risks and appropriate public 
responses to an IND detonation;
10. Pursue relevant research to improve effectiveness of countermeasures;
11. Ensure that highly redundant and multi-format modalities of communicating with the 
public during and after IND terrorism are developed, tested and available; and,
12. Consider re-opening and/or developing stocked public shelters for populations in high 
risk communities.
In the meantime, Congress should urgently expand funding to enhance our understanding of the 
barriers to nuclear preparedness planning and to substantially bolster and clarify the capacity and 
legal authority of the federal government to deploy massive resources in the event of a nuclear 
terrorism attack anywhere in the nation. Until planning barriers are resolved and concrete steps 




ASTHO  The Association of State and Territorial Health Officials 
CSI  Container Security Initiative 
CBP  Customs and Border Protection 
DoD  Department of Defense 
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DMAT Disaster Medical Assistance Teams 
DNDO The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
EMS  Emergency Medical Service 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium 
IND Improvised Nuclear Device 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
Kg  Kilograms 
Kt Kiloton 
NCDP  National Center for Disaster Preparedness 
NEST  Nuclear Emergency Support Teams 
NTI  Nuclear Threat Initiative 
PSR Physicians for Social Responsibility
Pu  Plutonium 
PCA  Posse Comitatus Act 
RDD Radiological Dispersal Device or “dirty bomb”
SNS  Strategic National Stockpile 
USCG  United States Coast Guard 
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command 




1. News Release. (2009, April 5). Remarks by President Barack Obama. Retrieved February 1, 2010 from: www.
whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.
2. Graham, B., & Talent, J. (2008, December 3). World at risk: The report of the commission on the prevention 
of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism. New York: Vintage Books.
3. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen quoted in (2008, April 2). Lieberman, Collins examine threat to the homeland 
from nuclear terrorist attack. Retrieved February 1, 2010 from: http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=Press.MajorityNews&ContentRecord_id=8d11d513-67aa-4a1f-abe0-
4c30bd4cee51&Region_id=&Issue_id=716b4c83-7747-4193-897b-632e5c281a91.
4. The task force report is quoted in Allison, G. (2001, November 18). It’s the Plutonium, Stupid .Los Angeles 
Times. Retrieved February 1,2010 from: http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/1157/its_the_
plutonium_stupid.html.
5. Quoted in Macfarquhar, N. (2008, October 28). Rate of Nuclear Thefts “Disturbingly High,” Monitoring 
Chief Says. New York Times.
6. Addressing the Nuclear Threat: Fulfilling the Promise of Prague at the L’Aquila Summit, July 8, 2009. 
Retrieved February 1, 2010 from www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Addressing-the-Nuclear-Threat-
Fulfilling-the-Promise-of-Prague-at-the-LAquila-Summit.
7. Zimmerman, P. D., & Lewis, J. G. (2006, November/December). The Bomb in the Backyard.  
Foreign Policy, 33.
8. (1998). The military critical technologies list: Weapons of mass destruction technologies, Section 5-Nuclear 
Weapons Technology. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition and Technology. Retrieved Februaruy 1, 2010 from: www.fas.org/irp/threat/mctl98-2/
p2sec05.pdf.
9. Ferguson, C. D., & Potter, W. C. Improvised nuclear devices and nuclear terrorism (No. 2), 1. Retrieved 
February 1, 2010 from: www.wmdcommission.org/files/No2.pdf.
10. Carter, A. B., May, M. M., & Perry, W. J. (2007). The day after: Action in the 24 hours following a nuclear 
blast in an American city, 4. Harvard and Stanford Universities. Retrieved February 1, 2010 from: http://
belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/dayafterworkshopreport_may2007.pdf.
11. Ferguson, C. D., & Potter, W. C. Improvised nuclear devices and nuclear terrorism (No. 2), 1. Retrieved 
February 1, 2010 from: www.wmdcommission.org/files/No2.pdf.
12. Ibid., 7.
13. Bunn, M., &Wier, A. (2006, July). Securing the bomb 2006. Nuclear Threat Initiative, vi-vii. Retrieved 
February 1, 2010 from: www.nti.org/e_research/stb06webfull.pdf. 
14. Ferguson, C. D., & Potter, W. C. Improvised nuclear devices and nuclear terrorism (No. 2). Retrieved 
February 1, 2010 from: www.wmdcommission.org/files/No2.pdf.
15. Bunn, M. (2007, September). Securing the bomb 2007. Nuclear Threat Initiative, v-vi. Retrieved February 1, 
2010 from: www.nti.org/e_research/securingthebomb07.pdf.
Regional Health and Public Health Preparedness for Nuclear Terrorism36
16. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (2009, February). World nuclear arsenals 2009. Retrieved 
February 1, 2010 from: www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=22710&prog=zg
p&proj=znpp.
17. Eisler, P. (2009, May 13). U.S. warhead disposal in 15 year backlog. USA Today, p.1A. Retrieved February 1, 
2010 from: www.usatoday.com/news/military/2009-05-12-nukes_N.htm.
18. Niksch, L.A. (2006, October 5). CRS report for congress: North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. 
Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress. Retrieved February 1, 2010 from http://fpc.state.
gov/documents/organization/74904.pdf.
19. Feller, B. (2009, June 16). Obama labels nuclear-armed NKorea ‘grave threat.’ Associated Press. Retrieved 
from: February 1, 2010 http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090616/ap_on_go_pr_wh/us_us_skorea.
20. Helfand, I., et. al. (2006). The US and nuclear terrorism: Still dangerously unprepared. Washington, DC. 7.
21. Harvard report quoted in Zuckerman, M. J. (2006). Nuclear doomsday: Is the clock still ticking? Retrieved 
from: www.carnegie.org/reporter/13/doomsday/index_low.html.
22. Bunn, M. (2008, November). Securing the Bomb 2008, 24,40. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved February 1, 
2010 from: www.nti.org/e_research/securing_the_bomb08.pdf.
23. Kean, T., et al. (2005, December 5). Final report on 9/11 commission recommendation, 9/11 public discourse 
project, 4. Retrieved February 1, 2010 from: www.9-11pdp.org/press/2005-12-05_report.pdf.
24. Bunn, M. (2008, April 2). The risk of nuclear terrorism—and next steps to reduce the danger, 5. Committee 
On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate. Retrieved February 1, 2010 from: 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bunn-nuclear-terror-risk-test-08.pdf.
25. Finlay, B.D. (2008, September). Nuclear terrorism: U.S. policies to reduce the threat of nuclear terror. 
Partnership for a Secure America. Retrieved February 1, 2010 from: www.pasonline.org/downloads/
NUCLEAR%20report%208-28-08.pdf.
26. GAO. (2008, January). Supply chain security: Examinations of high-risk cargo at foreign seaports have 
increased, but improved data collection and performance measures are needed, GAO-08-187. Retrieved 
February 1, 2010 from: www.gao.gov/new.items/d08187.pdf.
27. GAO. (2005, May). Homeland security: Key cargo security programs can be improved, GAO-05-466T. 
Retrieved February 1, 2010 from: www.gao.gov/new.items/d05466t.pdf.
28. GAO. (2009, January). Nuclear detection: Domestic nuclear detection office should improve planning to 
better address gaps and vulnerabilities, GAO-09-257. Retrieved February 1, 2010 from: www.gao.gov/new.
items/d09257.pdf.
29. Hall, Mimi. (2008, October). 2012 deadline to scan all port cargo won’t be met. USA Today. Retrieved 
February 1, 2010 from: www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-10-20-cargo_N.htm.
30. Radiation event medical management, nuclear explosions: Weapons, improvised nuclear devices. Retrieved 
February 1, 2010 from: www.remm.nlm.gov/nuclearexplosion.htm#blast.
31. Homeland Security Planning Scenarios, Scenario Nuclear Detonation, 10Kiloton Improvised Nuclear Device.
32. Radiation event medical management, nuclear explosions: Weapons, improvised nuclear devices. Retrieved 
February 1, 2010 from: www.remm.nlm.gov/nuclearexplosion.htm#blast.
33. Lawrence Livermore National Lab (LLNL) Presentation- 409771: Modeling improvised nuclear device 
(IND) impacts to tier I cities. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Health Affairs.
37End Notes
34. Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (2008). Public Health Emergency Preparedness, Six 
Years of Achievement. Retrieved February 1, 2010 from www.aphl.org/aphlprograms/ep/ahr/Documents/
PHEP_Partners_Report.pdf.
35. Ibid.
36. Institute of Medicine (2007). Emergency medical services at the crossroads, future of emergency care.
37. Homeland Security Council Interagency Policy Coordination Subcommittee for Preparedness and Response 
to Radiological and Nuclear Threats. (2009, January 16) Planning Guidance for Response to a Nuclear 
Detonation: Retrieved February 1, 2010 from: www.afrri.usuhs.mil/outreach/pdf/planning-guidance.pdf.
38. Maldin, B., Lam, C., Franco, C., Press, D., Waldhorn, R., Toner, E., et al. (2007). Regional approaches 
to hospital preparedness. Biosecurity & Bioterrorism, 5(1): 43. Retrieved February 1, 2010 from: www.
upmc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2007_orig-articles/2007_article_pdfs/2007-04-09-
regionalapproacheshospitalprep.pdf.
39. Hsu, E.B. et al. (2006). Are Regional Hospital Pharmacies Prepared for Public Health Emergencies? 
Biosecurity & Bioterrorism 4(3): 240.
40. Ibid: 242.
41. Ibid: 238.
42. Treat, K., Williams, J., Furbee, P., Manley, W., Russell, F., & Jr., C. S. (2001). Hospital preparedness for 
weapons of mass destruction incidents: An initial assessment. Annals of Emergency Medicine 38(5): 562.
43. Helfand, I., Forrow, L., & Tiwari, J. (2002). Nuclear terrorism. British Medical Journal, 324(7333): 357.
44. Bell, W. C., & Dallas, C. E. (2007). Vulnerability of populations and the urban health care systems to nuclear 




48. Gibb, J. R. (2008). Nuclear terrorism: Confronting the challenges of the day after. Washington, DC: US 
Senate, 7. Retrieved February 1, 2010 from: http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/041508Gibb.pdf.
49. Ibid: 6.
50. GAO. (2008, June). Emergency preparedness: States are planning for medical surge, but could benefit from 
shared guidance for allocating scarce medical resources, GAO-08-668, 6. Retrieved February 1, 2010 from: 
www.gao.gov/new.items/d08668.pdf.
51. Radiation event medical management: Exposure + contamination. Retrieved February 1, 2010 from: www.
remm.nlm.gov/exposurecontam.htm.
52. Cone, D. C., & Koenig, K. L. (2005). Mass casualty triage in the chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear 
environment. European Journal of Emergency Medicine, 12(6): 291.
53. Ibid: 298.
54. Dimaggio, C. (2005). The willingness of US emergency medical technicians to respond to terrorist incidents. 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism-Biodefense Strategy Practice and Science, 3(4). 333.
Regional Health and Public Health Preparedness for Nuclear Terrorism38
55. GAO. (2008, June). Emergency preparedness: States are planning for medical surge, but could benefit from 
shared guidance for allocating scarce medical resources. Washington, DC: 22-23. 
56. Dimaggio, C. (2005). The willingness of US emergency medical technicians to respond to terrorist incidents. 
Biosecurity and Bioterrorism-Biodefense Strategy Practice and Science, 3(4). 333.
57. Garrett A, Park YS, Redlener I. (2009) Reducing Absenteeism in the Hospital Workforce During a 
Pandemic. Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness. 2009.3 (Supp 2): S121-A131.
58. SAGA Foundation. (2008, January 2). Survey reveals nuclear terrorism is America’s Top Fear. Retrieved 
February 1, 2010 from: www.sagafoundation.org/SagaPressReleaseMaster.pdf.
59. SAGA Foundation. (2007, September 4). The language of nuclear terrorism. Retrieved from: www.
sagafoundation.org/SagaLuntzSurveyfinal.pdf.
60. Wray, R. J., Becker, S. M., et al. (2008). Communicating with the public about emerging health threats: 
Lessons from the pre-event message development project. American Journal of Public Health, 98(12).
61. Ibid.
62. Helfand, I., et al. (2006). The US and nuclear terrorism: Still dangerously unprepared. Washington, DC. 4.
63. Ibid: 4.
64. Ibid: 4.
65. Miskel, J. F. (2006). Disaster response and homeland security: what works, what doesn’t. Praeger Security 
International, xi: 162.
66. Mener, A. (2007). Disaster response in the US of America: An analysis of the bureaucratic and political 
history of a failing system. College Undergraduate Research Electronic Journal. Retrieved February 1, 2010 
from: http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1068&context=curej.
67. Redlener, I. (2006). Americans at risk : why we are not prepared for megadisasters and what we can do now. 
New York: Knopf, 1st Ed (xxvii).
68. Johannigman, J. A. (2005). Disaster preparedness: It’s all about me. Critical Care Medicine 33(1).
69. Trebilcock, M. C. T. (2000, October). The myth of posse comitatus. Journal of Homeland Security. Retrieved 
February 1, 2010 from: www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Search.aspx?s=trebilcock.
70. The Insurrection Act (10 USC 331-334) and 18 USC 831.
71. (2008, January 28). Public Law 110-181 Sec. 1082, the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act.
72. Federal Register / Vol. 74, No. 165 / Thursday, August 27, 2009 / Notices, retrieved February 1,2010 from 
http://frwebgate1.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/PDFgate.cgi?WAISdocID=827498177343+0+2+0&WAISaction
=retrieve.
73. (2008, April 2). Lieberman, Collins examine threat to the homeland from nuclear terrorist attack. Retrieved 
February 1,2010 from Senator Joe Lieberman’s on-line newsroom: http://lieberman.senate.gov/newsroom/
release.cfm?id=295440.
39About the National Center for Disaster Preparedness (NCDP)
About the National Center for Disaster Preparedness (NCDP)
The NCDP is an academically-based resource center dedicated to the study, analysis and 
enhancement of the nation’s ability to prepare for and respond to major disasters, including ter-
rorism. The NCDP has a wide-ranging research, training and education, and advocacy agenda, 
with a special interest in megadisasters. Senior faculty and staff have testified at Congressio-
nal hearings, presented at numerous conferences and meetings, and consulted with govern-
mental, healthcare, non-profit, industry, and community leaders. Founded in 2003 by Irwin 
Redlener, MD, the NCDP engages the public health workforce and communities in prepar-
ing for catastrophic events, while helping to integrate preparedness efforts into the nation’s 
existing infrastructure. The Center encompasses the CDC-funded Center for Public Health 
Preparedness at Columbia, which has trained over 15,000 responders in public health prepared-
ness, incident management, and recognition and response to incidents involving weapons of mass 
destruction using table-top drills, exercises, and distance learning technologies. 
www.ncdp.mailman.columbia.edu
About the Authors
Dr. Irwin Redlener 
Dr. Redlener is a Professor of Clinical Public Health at the Columbia University Mailman School 
of Public Health and Director of the NCDP. He is also a Commissioner on the Congressionally-
established National Commission on Children and Disasters and the President and Co-Founder 
of the Children’s Health Fund.
Dr. Andrew L. Garrett
Until January, 2010, Dr. Garrett was the Director of the Planning and Response Division at the 
NCDP. He is a public health researcher, pediatrician, and EMS/disaster medicine physician with 
broad experience in field response and emergency medical services.
Karen L. Levin RN MPH CHES
Ms. Levin is Director for the NCDP Center for Public Health Preparedness and is the Associate 
Director of the Planning and Response Division. Ms. Levin has broad experience in public health 
emergency preparedness and response at the state and local level.
Andrew Mener
Mr. Mener is a medical student at George Washington University, and served as a research assis-
tant at the NCDP.
Regional Health and Public Health Preparedness for Nuclear Terrorism40





Karen L. Levin RN MPH CHES 
Director Center for Public Health Preparedness 
National Center for Disaster Preparedness  
Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health 
646-845-2325 
kll2121@columbia.edu
Irwin Redlener, MD 
Director, National Center for Disaster Preparedness 
Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health 
(212) 535-9707 
ir2110@columbia.edu
N A T I O N A L  C E N T E R  F O R  D I S A S T E R  P R E P A R E D N E S S
Regional Health and  
Public Health Preparedness  
for Nuclear Terrorism:
Optimizing Survival in a Low Probability/High Consequence Disaster
www.ncdp.mailman.columbia.edu
regional health and public health preparedness for nuclear terrorism
national center for disaster preparedness
